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I. INTRODUCTION  
In today’s complicated world, the distinction between international 
and domestic issues can be a fine line, and one that States are still in 
the process of settling.1 This is especially true for embassies and 
diplomatic missions, which, among their various duties, must assist 
with the processing and transportation of refugees.2 Furthermore, 
consuls have in the past provided protection to foreign nationals 
when such persons have previously been persecuted by their home 
State.3 But may a State’s embassy provide protection to a national of 
the host State without violating international law?  
This question arose in late April of 2012, when Chen Guangcheng 
escaped from unofficial house arrest in Shandong Province, 
ultimately seeking protection from American diplomats in Beijing.4 
The U.S. Embassy sheltered Chen, and the Chinese government 
condemned the undertaking as violating international law.5 However, 
 
 1. See EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 461 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining how 
States direct multiple agencies within foreign States to aid in investment and 
immigration control in addition to the conveyance of their culture). 
 2. See generally LUKE T. LEE & JOHN QUIGLEY, CONSULAR LAW AND 
PRACTICE 107–15 (3d ed. 2008) (presenting an in-depth discussion of consular 
functions ranging from the protection of nationals to the processing of refugees). 
 3. See, e.g., Corey Flintoff, The Current U.S.-China Standoff Has a 
Precedent, NPR (Apr. 30, 2012), www.npr.org/2012/04/30/151706572/the-
current-u-s-china-standoff-has-a-precedent (referring to Fang Lizhi, who sought 
protection from the American Embassy in Beijing for over one year after his 
involvement with the Tiananmen Square protests). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Remarks on Chen 
Guangcheng’s Entering the U.S. Embassy in China, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS OF CHINA (May 2, 2012), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/ 
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China also potentially violated international law by subjecting Chen 
and his family to torture during his house arrest.6 
This comment will first discuss the relevant international law 
applicable in this case, including the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, the Convention Against Torture, and jus 
cogens norms.7 It will then discuss whether China’s treatment of 
Chen constituted a violation of international human rights laws, 
justifying encroachment into China’s internal affairs by the United 
States.8 The comment will conclude that protecting victims of human 
rights abuses does not amount to interference with the internal affairs 
of the host state.9 Finally, the comment will recommend that the 
United States clarify its policy regarding Article 41 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Rights and that the Convention Against 
Torture should include a provision that Article 3 of the Convention 
applies without geographic limitations.10 
II. BACKGROUND  
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Chen, blind since childhood, is a self-taught lawyer from China’s 
rural Shandong province.11 In 2005, Chen filed a class-action lawsuit 
against officials in his province, accusing them of forcing women to 
undergo late-term abortions and sterilization under China’s one-child 
 
t928382.htm [hereinafter Remarks on Entering Embassy] (“The US Embassy in 
China has the obligation to abide by relevant international laws and Chinese laws, 
and should not engage in activities irrelevant to its duties.”). 
 6. See Jane Perlez & Andrew Jacobs, A Car Chase, Secret Talks and Second 
Thoughts, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/world/asia/ 
a-car-chase-secret-talks-and-second-thoughts.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&ref= 
global=home (averring that the Chens were severely beaten when they tried to 
communicate with the outside world). 
 7. See discussion infra Part II(B)–(D). 
 8. See discussion infra Part III(B) (establishing that officials in China posed a 
serious threat to Chen’s safety that created an obligation for the United States not 
to return Chen to China). 
 9. See discussion infra Part III(C). 
 10. See discussion infra Part IV (recommending these improvements to prevent 
comparable occurrences in the future). 
 11. Sui-Lee Wee, Blind Chinese Activist’s Brother Says Officials Destroyed 
Abuse Evidence, REUTERS (June 8, 2012 7:01 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/06/08/us-china-dissident-village-idUSBRE8570FP20120608. 
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policy.12 Chen was placed under house arrest beginning in August 
2005 and was formally arrested in June 2006 for allegedly disrupting 
traffic and damaging property.13 After serving his four-year sentence, 
Chen was released from prison in September 2010.14 Following his 
release, Chen and his family were placed under house arrest and 
isolated from the outside world,15 even though no additional charges 
were brought against Chen.16  
While under house arrest, Chen and his family were prevented by 
the local government from communicating with the outside world.17 
Any attempt by Chen or his wife to leave or contact the outside 
world resulted in beatings from guards hired by local government 
officials.18 Moreover, anyone attempting to visit Chen was accosted, 
beaten, and turned away by the guards.  
Chen escaped from house arrest in late April 2012 and sought 
protection at the American Embassy in Beijing.19 Once Chen was 
inside the embassy, American officials negotiated with Chinese 
Foreign Ministry officials to guarantee his protection should he leave 
the embassy.20 Since Chen left Shandong province, his remaining 
 
 12. China’s Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2012), 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17866176. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Elizabeth M. Lynch, Slow Killing in Rural China, CHINA LAW & POLICY 
(Feb. 29, 2012), http://chinalawandpolicy.com/2012/02/29/slow-killing-in-rural-
china. 
 15. See id. (describing Chen as “currently under unlawful house arrest with his 
wife and two small children, guarded 24 hours a day by local thugs, denied access 
to medical care as well as to all visitors and at times subject to physical abuse”). 
 16. See Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6 (explaining that no charges were pending 
when the decision was made to turn Chen’s home into a “makeshift prison”); Chen 
Guangcheng, Op-Ed., How China Flouts Its Laws, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, 
www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/opinion/how-china-flouts-its-laws.html (suggesting 
that Chen was subjected to house arrest without any valid legal basis for the 
detention). 
 17. See Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6 (“When the Chens broke the rules – by 
trying to sneak out messages or secretly detailing their mistreatment in a 
homemade video – they were viciously beaten.”). 
 18. See Erik Eckholm, Even in New York, China Casts a Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/asia/chen-guancheng-is-safe-
in-new-york-but-thinks-of-china.html?_r=2&hp (describing beatings Chen and his 
family received from local police). 
 19. Keith B. Richburg & Steven Mufson, Chen Guangcheng, Blind Chinese 
Lawyer-Activist, Escapes House Arrest, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2012, at A8. 
 20. See Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6 (mentioning that Chen chose not to 
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family members have suffered at the hands of local officials.21 Local 
police beat Chen’s brother as well as his brother’s family late one 
night, and Chen’s nephew was arrested when he attempted to fight 
off the intruders.22 
Eventually Chinese and American officials reached an agreement 
whereby Chen, along with his family, would be allowed to travel to 
New York City, where he could study law at New York University.23 
Chen and his family left China on May 19, 2012.24 However, the 
agreement did not stop Chinese officials from condemning the 
United States’ actions, declaring that the United States had violated 
international law by protecting Chen during his time at the American 
Embassy.25 
After news broke that Chen had escaped house arrest and had 
sought shelter from the American Embassy in Beijing, the Chinese 
government wasted little time before publicly protesting. The 
Chinese spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Liu 
Weimen, released several statements in early May accusing the 
United States of violating international law by meddling in China’s 
internal affairs.26 Although Liu did not explicitly say which 
 
assert an asylum claim in the United States and therefore American officials at first 
attempted to broker a deal for protection in China). 
 21. See Eckholm, supra note 18 (describing how police “rampaged” through 
Chen’s home, beating those they found there). 
 22. See id. (expounding that his brother’s wife now has limited mobility of her 
right arm due to the beatings); Wee, supra note 11 (noting that Chen’s nephew 
now faces homicide charges for resisting officials). 
 23. Eckholm, supra note 18 (noting that Chen’s status as a visiting scholar is 
for an indefinite period of time). 
 24. China’s Blind Activist, supra note 12. 
 25. See Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5 (asserting that the United 
States violated international law by interfering with China’s internal affairs); see 
also Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Remarks on US Secretary of 
State Clinton’s Public Statement on Chen Guangcheng, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS OF CHINA (May 3, 2012), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/ 
s2510/t928383.htm (reiterating China’s disapproval of the United States’ actions) 
[hereinafter Remarks on US Secretary of State Clinton’s Public Statement]; Mo 
Nong, US Violates International Law, CHINA DAILY (May 7, 2012), 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-05/07/content_15221189.htm (“If the US 
government follows international laws and the basic norms of relations among 
nations, it does not have the right to make any demands on the Chinese 
government. . . . It has broken international laws and Chinese laws and interfered 
in China’s internal affairs.”). 
 26. See Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5; Remarks on US Secretary 
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international law the United States had violated, the fact that the 
statement refers to interference in internal affairs suggests Liu was 
referencing Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations.27 Because Chen is a Chinese citizen, the Chinese 
government asserts that the American Embassy has no interest in 
protecting him and has instead engaged “in activities irrelevant to its 
duties.”28 The Chinese government believes that, as Chen was being 
handled by local Chinese officials, the situation was outside any of 
the United States’ diplomatic duties and constituted an interference 
that was motivated by non-diplomatic reasons.29  
In China it is common for the government to physically abuse and 
torture political and legal activists.30 Additionally, political dissidents 
receive exceptionally savage mistreatment compared with the 
average prisoner.31 Those who speak out against China’s one-child 
policy are often granted asylum in the United States because the risk 
of torture is so severe.32 The United States has even protected 
 
of State Clinton’s Public Statement, supra note 25. 
 27. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 41(1), Apr. 18, 1961, 
23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“Without 
prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying 
such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving 
State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.”); 
see also Julian Ku, Who Violated International Law in the Chen Case: The U.S. or 
China?, OPINIO JURIS (May 3, 2012 3:24 AM), opiniojuris.org/2015/05/03/who-
violated-international-law-in-the-chen-case-the-u-s-or-china/ (stating that China 
probably considered the United States’ actions to violate Article 41 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations). 
 28. Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5. 
 29. See, e.g., Nong, supra note 25 (alleging that, from a Chinese perspective, 
the United States’ aid to Chen and interference with China’s internal affairs 
hinders China’s development). 
 30. See XIAOBING LI, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CHINA 120–21 (2010) (asserting that 
in 2006 “at least 930 cases of police torture took place”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2011: CHINA 3 (2011) [hereinafter STATE 
DEPARTMENT CHINA REPORT], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/186478.pdf (affirming that activists continue to suffer official 
harassment). 
 31. STATE DEPARTMENT CHINA REPORT, supra note 30, at 4 (reporting that 
political and religious prisoners were subject to tortuous treatment that was 
particularly harsh compared to that of ordinary prisoners). 
 32. See, e.g., Cao v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 407 F.3d 146, 150, 161 
(3d Cir. 2005) (granting review of the denial of asylum to protect the applicant 
from repercussions for exposing abhorrent abortion and infanticide practices in 
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political activists inside the American Embassy before, just as it did 
for Chen.33 
B. VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
The purpose of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is 
to create a set of rules to govern the interaction between diplomatic 
missions and sovereign States.34 Most States, including both the 
United States and China, have ratified this treaty.35 Article 41(1) 
requires States to both respect the laws of the host State and not 
interfere with the host State’s internal affairs.36  
Although few cases have interpreted this particular section, the 
International Court of Justice has stated that the purpose of this 
article was to prevent embassy staff from engaging in actions that 
were an abuse of an embassy’s functions, such as espionage.37 
Article 41(1) places the obligation of non-interference in internal 
affairs closely to the obligation to respect the receiving State’s laws, 
making the article difficult to interpret and leading to multiple 
disagreements over whether conduct constituted interference in 
internal affairs.38  
However, commentary on Article 41 suggests that the rule was 
formulated to restrict a diplomat’s personal comments and activities, 
executed on his or her own without direction from the embassy.39 
 
Chinese hospitals to a Hong Kong reporter). 
 33. See Flintoff, supra note 3 (referring to the case of Fang Lizhi, an 
astrophysicist whose writings prompted the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989). 
 34. See Vienna Convention, supra note 27, pmbl. 
 35. See BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 345 
(2009–2010 ed. 2009) (listing the multitude of States that have signed the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, including the United States and China). 
 36. Vienna Convention, supra note 27, art. 41(1). 
 37. See U.S. Diplomatic Relations and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States 
v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 84 (May 24) (revealing that Article 41 was included to 
ensure that diplomatic missions are not used in ways that are contradictory to 
diplomatic purposes). 
 38. See, e.g., DENZA, supra note 1, at 466 (recounting a disagreement between 
the United Kingdom and Burma in which the Burmese government accused the 
British of meddling in internal affairs because the British Ambassador attempted to 
visit opposition leader Aung Suu Kyi). 
 39. Id. at 464. But see Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Scope of Consular Immunity 
Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Towards a Principled 
Interpretation, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 841, 847 (1998) (disputing such an 
interpretation and noting that some approach Article 41 as applicable to any 
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Conflicts have often arisen between a host State’s desire to be free 
from interference in its internal affairs and another State’s desire to 
promote human rights.40 
C. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND NONREFOULEMENT 
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention 
Against Torture in 1984, and the Convention went into effect in 
1987.41 The first article in the Convention Against Torture 42 states 
that torture may be committed by inflicting pain on a person, or a 
third person, with the purpose of obtaining information from, 
punishing, or intimidating the person.43 Arbitrary detention can be 
considered a form of torture.44 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted the 
definition of torture in Bromfield v. Mukasey,45 a case involving a 
Jamaican national plaintiff who claimed he could not be returned to 
Jamaica because of the violence against homosexuals that he would 
be subject to there.46 The Ninth Circuit held that beatings and killings 
 
activity that “adversely affects the interests of the receiving State or its nationals”). 
 40. DENZA, supra note 1, at 465–66; see also LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 2, at 
77 (“Diplomats and consuls have on occasion assisted receiving State nationals 
whose human rights may have been violated by the receiving State. Receiving 
States have at times objected to such activity as interference in their internal 
affairs.”). 
 41. HANS DANELIUS, CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, 
INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 1 (2008), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/catcidtp/catcidtp_e.pdf. 
 42. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture] (“[A]ny act by which severe 
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person 
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, 
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering 
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person action in an official capacity.”). 
 43. Id.; accord 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18 (2012) (codifying obligations under the 
Convention Against Torture in U.S. domestic law). 
 44. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184–85 (D. Mass. 1995) 
(recognizing that arbitrary detention is a violation of international law equal to 
torture, summary executions, and disappearance). 
 45. 543 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 46. Id. at 1073. 
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constitute acts of torture.47 Additionally, it is not necessary to 
demonstrate that the government will torture the individual, but 
merely that the government acquiesced or was willfully blind to the 
performance of torture.48 In Bromfield, the court found that sufficient 
evidence existed to demonstrate that the Jamaican government 
acquiesced to the torture of homosexuals, and remanded the case to 
determine if the plaintiff would more likely than not be tortured on 
his return.49  
The fact that an individual may be unable to assert an asylum 
claim under United States law does not necessarily bar that 
individual from relief under the Convention Against Torture.50 In 
addition to preventing torture, the Convention Against Torture also 
forbids a State from expelling, returning, or extraditing a person to 
another state if there is a substantial danger that the person would 
be tortured on his return.51 This is otherwise known as 
nonrefoulement, a principle also established in the Refugee 
Convention.52 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits 
member States from expelling or returning a refugee to a place 
where his or her freedom or life is threatened due to race, religion, 
 
 47. Id. at 1079 (citing Comollari v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 
2004)); accord Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that Al-Saher was entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture because 
the sustained and severe beatings he suffered constituted torture). 
 48. Bromfield, 543 F.3d at 1079; accord Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 
1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006) (“It is enough that public officials could have inferred 
torture was taking place, remained willfully blind to it, or simply stood by because 
of their inability or unwillingness to oppose it.”). 
 49. Bromfield, 543 F.3d at 1079 (referencing the criminalization of homosexual 
conduct, the lack of investigation by police into abuse of gay men, and the Country 
Report showing that gay men are often beaten and killed as the evidence relied on 
by the court). 
 50. See Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that 
“claims for relief under the Convention are analytically separate for claims of 
asylum”); see also Richard P. Shafer, Construction and Application of the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment, or Punishment, 184 A.L.R. FED. 385, § 2 (2003) (detailing authority 
which holds that the inability to state an asylum claim does not necessarily 
preclude relief). 
 51. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 3(1). 
 52. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 4 (2008), available 
at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/prsr/prsr_e.pdf. 
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nationality, or membership in a political or social group.53 
An important factor to be considered when determining whether 
there is a risk of torture upon return includes the occurrence of 
torture in the recent past.54 A pattern of mass human rights violations 
will be considered but that alone is not enough to prove a risk of 
torture, although the Committee will look at all relevant 
considerations.55 There must be additional grounds to show that the 
specific individual was at risk for torture on his or her return other 
than only a pattern of mass violations.56 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights addressed the 
principle of nonrefoulement in Haitian Interdiction v. United 
States.57 In this case, the petitioners claimed that the United States 
had been intercepting Haitian refugees (“boat people”) and returning 
them to Haiti where they regularly faced a severe threat of abuse 
from the Haitian military.58 The petitioners demonstrated that 
military authorities burned down hundreds of houses belonging to 
activists and supporters of opposing factions.59 Once the United 
States Coast Guard seized the refugees, they were handed over to 
Haitian immigration authorities where the Haitian military 
 
 53. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 1951, 
189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention] (“No Contracting State shall 
expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”). 
 54. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, A.R. v. Neth., Communication No. 
203/2002, U.N. Doc. A/59/44, at 252 (Nov. 14, 2003) (holding that the 
complainant, who was previously tortured twenty years beforehand, did not show a 
violation of the Convention when the time lapse increased the probability that 
conditions in the receiving State had drastically changed). 
 55. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Bachan Singh Sogi v. Can., 
Communication No. 297/2006, U.N. Doc. A/63/44, at 234 (Nov. 16, 2007) 
(explaining that when evaluating the risk of torture, “the Committee must take 
account of all relevant considerations, including the existence of a consistent 
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights”). 
 56. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil 
Agiza v. Swed., Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. A/60/44, at 227 (May 
20, 2005) (“[A]dditional grounds must exist to show that the individual concerned 
was personally at risk.”). 
 57. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 51/96, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1997). 
 58. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
 59. Id. ¶¶ 25, 39–41. 
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interrogated and threatened them.60 
The petitioners in Haitian Interdiction argued that the United 
States violated customary international law, which prohibits the 
return of refugees to their home country when they would face 
persecution or a threat against their life if returned.61 The United 
States responded by arguing that Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention was a narrow duty that only applied to refugees who had 
already reached the territory of the contracting State.62 The 
Commission did not agree with the United States, instead holding 
that “Article 33 ha[s] no geographical limitations.”63  
D. JUS COGENS NORMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Jus cogens norms are principles of international law that are 
acknowledged by the international community to be of such vital 
importance that no derogation will be tolerated.64 Jus cogens norms 
are at the top of a normative hierarchy, meaning that these norms 
override treaties, persistent objections, or claims of extenuating 
circumstances.65 States have an interest in human rights violations 
regardless of where the offense occurs because the obligation to 
prevent human rights abuses runs to all States.66 Diplomatic missions 
 
 60. See id. ¶¶ 26–27 (submitting evidence that the returnees “were asked why 
they left Haiti, and were verbally abused by the police,” who periodically 
“threatened to imprison and kill them”). 
 61. Id. ¶ 3. 
 62. Id. ¶ 71. Contra Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 
1969, 25 I.L.M. 543, 115 U.N.T.S. 331 (proclaiming that a State cannot engage in 
behavior that undermines the purpose of a treaty). 
 63. Haitian Interdiction, Case 10.675 ¶¶ 157, 171 (stating that the United 
State’s “act of interdicting Haitians on the high seas, placing them in vessels under 
their jurisdiction, returning them to Haiti, and leaving them exposed to acts of 
brutality by the Haitian military and its supporters constitutes a breach of the right 
to security of the Haitian refugees”). 
 64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102 cmt. k (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW]; see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 
765 (July 11) (Kreca, J., dissenting) (affirming that a State may intercede when a 
human rights violation occurs even if the violation does not concern a national of 
the State). 
 65. BRAD R. ROTH, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT: 
PREMISES OF A PLURALIST INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 264 (2011). 
 66. See RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 64, § 703 
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are increasingly concerned with working to preserve human rights 
for non-nationals.67  
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held 
in Domingues v. United States that an American State’s law that 
subjects juveniles to the death penalty does not supersede human 
rights treaties preventing such punishment.68 Domingues, the 
petitioner, was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death in 
Nevada.69 Domingues was only sixteen years old when he committed 
the crimes.70 Domingues claimed the United States violated a jus 
cogens norm forbidding juvenile offenders from being executed, 
breaching Article 1 of the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man.71 To prove a jus cogens norm existed, Dominquez 
relied on various treaties and conventions that forbid the execution of 
criminal offenders under eighteen years of age.72  
 
cmt. a (“Unless the human rights agreement provides or clearly implies otherwise, 
the ordinary remedies are available to any state party against a state party violating 
the agreement, even if the violation did not affect nationals of the claimant state 
party or any other particular interest of that state.”); see also ANTONIO CASSESE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 394–95 (2d ed. 2005) (suggesting that human rights 
violations create community obligations, meaning that any action to correct human 
rights abuses is exercised on behalf of the entire international community). 
 67. See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 2, at 208–09 (“These principles would 
seem to cover the right of a sending State, through its diplomatic and consular 
personnel, to take a variety of measures in regard to the rights of persons 
regardless of nationality, over and against an objection by the receiving State that 
the action is an unlawful interference in its internal affairs”). 
 68. Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 62/02, OEA/Serv.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1, ¶ 85 (2002). 
 69. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
 70. Id. ¶ 2. 
 71. Id. ¶ 3 (claiming that the United States violated the treaty by failing to 
prevent the State of Nevada from executing juveniles); see also American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. 1, Res. XXX, Final Act of the 
Ninth International Conference of American States (Pan American Union), 
Bogota, Colombia, Mar. 30–May 2, 1948, at 38; reprinted in Handbook of 
Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 Doc. 21 Rev. 6, at 
5 (1979) (“Every human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his 
person.”). 
 72. Domingues, Case 12.285, ¶ 19 (citing, inter alia, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child art. 37(1), Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
(preventing execution of those under 18; ratified by 189 of the 191 countries in the 
United Nations) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 
6(5), Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (forbidding 
minors from being executed; ratified by the United States in 1992). 
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The Commission found that ratification of treaties since 1987 
showed sufficient widespread agreement to constitute a norm 
disallowing the execution of persons under the age of eighteen.73 In 
conclusion, the Commission stated that the United States “acted 
contrary to international norms of jus cogens . . . by sentencing 
Michael Domingues to the death penalty for crimes that he 
committed when he was 16 years of age.”74 Although the United 
States argued that they were not bound by the norm because of the 
United States’ persistent objections,75 the Commission rejected this 
argument, holding that a jus cogens norm “cannot be validly 
derogated from, whether by treaty or by objection of a State, 
persistent or otherwise.”76  
When a State violates its human rights obligations, any other State 
may pursue remedies against the violator.77 The International Court 
of Justice has held that States are bound by customary international 
law not to torture.78 For example, the Court ruled that Uganda’s 
torture of civilians in the Congo, among other atrocities, violated 
international law.79 Torture and prolonged arbitrary detention 
constitute human rights violations that are prohibited by jus cogens 
norms.80 
 
 73. Domingues, Case 12.285, ¶ 68 (mentioning the acceptance by nearly all 
States of treaties prohibiting execution of juveniles). 
 74. Id. ¶ 112. 
 75. See id. ¶ 101 (“[T]he United States contends that it has consistently 
asserted its right to execute juvenile offenders, by making reservations to treaties, 
filing briefs before national and international tribunals, and making public 
statements . . . .”). 
 76. Id. ¶ 85. 
 77. RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 64, § 703(2), 
cmt. b (stating that these obligations apply even if the victims are not nationals of 
the enforcing State and do not affect the enforcing State’s interests). 
 78. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 80 (Dec. 19) (holding that obligations under 
international humanitarian law and human rights law not to torture “are binding on 
the Parties as customary international law”). 
 79. Id. at 77 (concluding that UPDF troops committed “torture and other forms 
of inhumane treatment of the civilian population . . . and did not take measures to 
ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the occupied 
territories”). 
 80. See Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming 
that beatings and killings constitute torture); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 
162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating that torture and arbitrary detention “constitute 
fully recognizable violations of international law”); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. CHINA IS GUILTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BECAUSE ITS 
TREATMENT OF CHEN AND OTHER POLITICAL ACTIVISTS 
CONSTITUTES TORTURE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Chinese officials’ treatment of Chen81 satisfies the plain 
meaning of torture under Article 1 of the Convention Against 
Torture.82 To be considered torture, the pain or suffering experienced 
must be severe and intentionally inflicted.83 Finally, the physical pain 
inflicted cannot be torture without an accompanying motivation or 
acquiescence of the government or a public official.84 
China’s treatment of Chen meets the element of pain and 
suffering. In Chen’s case, he was kept under house arrest even 
though there were no charges against him at that time,85 which is a 
form of mental suffering because he was not allowed to go about his 
daily life.86 In addition, Chen and his wife were physically beaten 
when they attempted to leave or contact the outside world during 
their detention.87 Visitors to Chen’s home were often turned away 
and harassed in an attempt to intimidate Chen and further increase 
his isolation and mental anguish.88 Furthermore, Chinese officials 
retaliated against Chen after his escape by both assaulting his 
 
34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 11, 275 (2002) (asserting that “the prohibition against torture 
has achieved the status of a preemptory norm in international law”). 
 81. See discussion supra Part II(A) (discussing the Chinese government’s 
behavior toward Chen). 
 82. See DANELIUS, supra note 41, at 141 (explaining that the definition of 
torture as set out in the Convention Against Torture is more “elaborate” and 
“complex” than previous definitions); see also STATE DEPARTMENT CHINA 
REPORT, supra note 30, at 2–8 (reporting on the regular torture and detention of 
individuals to prevent the expression of opposing viewpoints). 
 83. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 1(1); see also discussion 
supra Part II(C) (delineating the requirements for an act to constitute torture). 
 84. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 1(1). 
 85. Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6 (recounting that Chen had been held captive 
in his home since his release from jail in September 2010). 
 86. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184–85 (D. Mass. 1995) 
(recognizing that arbitrary detention is a violation of international law equal to 
torture, summary executions, and disappearance). 
 87. Id.; Chen, supra note 16. 
 88. See Lynch, supra note 14 (reporting that 100 guards and 2 cellphone 
jammers were employed to keep Chen isolated from the world). 
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brother’s family and attacking his brother’s home.89 
Not only did China inflict pain and suffering on Chen, but the 
level at which they did so is sufficiently severe to constitute torture.90 
The local Chinese officials intentionally inflicted this pain and 
suffering on Chen by beating him and his family in an attempt to 
control Chen’s behavior and to persecute him for his activism.91 The 
pain is factually severe because the security officers also inflicted 
brutal attacks on Chen’s visitors and family in addition to confining 
his family.92  
Chen’s abuse satisfies one essential element of torture; therefore, 
the analysis may proceed to address the element of coercion.93 Under 
the Convention Against Torture, to be considered torture, 
government action must be undertaken in an effort to intimidate or 
coerce the victim.94 In this case, China’s motivations were to 
pressure Chen to discontinue his efforts at political and legal 
activism.95 In 2005, Chen filed a class-action lawsuit against Chinese 
officials for imposing the one-child population law through forced, 
late-term abortions and sterilization.96 Chen’s defiant actions angered 
 
 89. Chen, supra note 16. 
 90. Cf. Cao v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 407 F.3d 146, 150, 154 (3d Cir. 
2005) (determining that in the plaintiff’s case, beatings administered by public 
security officers and other prisoners during an interrogation amounted to torture). 
 91. See Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(differentiating between random violence and persecution because of a person’s 
protected status). 
 92. Cf. Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil 
Agiza v. Swed., Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. A/60/44, at 198, ¶ 2.4 
(May 20, 2005) (detailing how the petitioner’s “wife contended that, if returned 
she would be detained for many years as the complainant’s wife” which was taken 
into consideration when determining their status under the principle of 
nonrefoulement). 
 93. See CAROL BOHMER & AMY SHUMAN, REJECTING REFUGEES: POLITICAL 
ASYLUM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 205 (2008) (“In fact the U.S. law, which 
expressively makes objection to coercive population control a basis for asylum 
(like the one-child policy in China), counts this as persecution based on political 
opinion.”). 
 94. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 1(1); see also Omelas-
Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the 
motivation requirement of torture may also be satisfied by willful blindness). 
 95. See LI, supra note 30, at 44–45 (affirming that Chinese authorities harass 
and torture political and legal activists to restrict their expression on divergent 
opinions). 
 96. Richburg & Mufson, supra note 19. 
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the Chinese government.97 Since Chen filed suit, Chinese officials 
have persecuted and imprisoned Chen, charging him with trumped-
up charges to silence his criticism of the Chinese government.98  
The fact that the Chinese officials originally jailed Chen as a 
response to his legal activism shows a clear intent to punish Chen for 
opposing Chinese policy.99 Furthermore, that Chen was held under 
house arrest and repeatedly beaten, shows an organized effort to 
maintain his punishment.100 Chen had done nothing new to warrant 
punishment, evidenced by China’s failure to file new charges against 
Chen, which further demonstrates that Chinese officials sought to 
continue constraining Chen’s speech and activity.101 
The final requirement for these acts to be considered torture is that 
they must be committed by someone in an official capacity.102 In 
addition to satisfying the previous elements under the Convention 
Against Torture, Chen’s treatment constitutes torture because local 
officials conducted the abuse. Chen was held under house arrest and 
beaten by plain-clothed guards hired by local government officials.103 
Reports indicate that high-level Chinese government officials did not 
directly participate, and instead local security guards instigated and 
acquiesced to the torture;104 this, however, does not preclude a claim 
 
 97. See Eckholm, supra note 18 (describing widespread acceptance that 
charges were filed against Chen in 2006 simply because he brought class-action 
lawsuits against forced abortion policies). 
 98. See Richburg & Mufson, supra note 19 (describing Chen’s trial on 
obstructing traffic charges as a sham that has been largely discredited). 
 99. See China’s Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng, supra note 12 (affirming that 
many believe the Chinese government brought charges against Chen simply to 
silence him). 
 100. See Lynch, supra note 14 (quoting Professor Jerome A. Cohen, a Chinese 
legal scholar, as saying “[t]his cruel, slow killing seems to be the only way the 
Party can think of to rid itself of a courageous critic without having him appear to 
die in its custody”). 
 101. See id. (“Lacking any legal basis under Chinese law and in contravention to 
multiple international treaties, since his ‘release,’ Chen and his wife have not been 
able to leave their home.”). 
 102. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 1(1); see also Bromfield v. 
Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that those in an official 
capacity need only be willfully blind to the torture). 
 103. Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6. 
 104. See China’s Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng, supra note 12 (stating 
analysts believe that local security was “apparently acting outside the law but with 
the authorities’ approval”). 
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of torture.105 
Even if Chinese government officials did not direct the local 
officials to torture Chen, his harsh treatment was well documented 
by human rights organizations and media throughout the world, 
making it difficult to believe that high-level officials were unaware 
of the abuse.106 In addition, the international community condemned 
China’s treatment of Chen in Shandong province, with prominent 
international figures calling for investigation into the matter.107 The 
massive coverage of Chen’s circumstances was enough to put China 
on notice that local officials were conducting torture, yet still China 
did nothing to remedy the situation or even inquire into the 
allegations.108 The Chinese government was at least willfully blind to 
the torture of Chen by local officials, even though they did not carry 
out the torture themselves.109 Moreover, Chinese officials have not 
objected to claims that local officials tortured Chen nor have they 
condemned such actions, suggesting tacit approval of the local 
 
 105. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 1 (articulating that 
torture can be found where there is “acquiescence of a public official”). 
 106. See Richburg & Mufson, supra note 19 (referencing several groups 
monitoring Chen’s detention, including the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the 
Asia Society, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Chinese 
community website Boxun.com); China’s Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng, supra 
note 12 (reporting on politicians who voiced concern for Chen, such as Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton). 
 107. See Clinton Presses China on Human Rights Before Hu’s Visit, CHANNEL 
NEWS ASIA (Jan. 15, 2011), www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/ 
view/1104813/1/.html (detailing how Secretary of State Clinton urged China to 
release numerous dissidents, including Chen, before a State visit by Hu Jintao). 
 108. See Chen, supra note 16 (recounting how Chen asked the Chinese 
government to investigate the abuse, though Chinese officials have done nothing); 
see also Political Prisoners in China: Trends and Implications for U.S. Policy 
Before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 112th Cong. (2010) 
(statement of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law & Co-Director, US-Asia Law 
Institute New York University), available at www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/ 
2010/20100803/statement2.php (testifying that political dissidents are often 
harassed by police and detained after serving their sentences, suggesting that 
Chinese officials have knowledge of these practices). 
 109. See ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, Impact of Human Rights on State 
Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BEYOND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON 
SOVEREIGNTY, NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 367, 371–72 (2011) 
(stating that the International Law Commission considers acts committed by any 
division or agency of the State to be conduct attributable to that State, especially in 
cases of human rights violations such as torture). 
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officials’ conduct.110  
The local officials’ maltreatment of Chen is in line with the 
systematic handling of legal activists in China, further supporting the 
claim that the Chinese government either knew about or implicitly 
endorsed the use of torture.111 Lawyers in China are often subjected 
to violence, including the physical assault of lawyers attempting to 
conduct court business.112 Such actions, like in Chen’s case, amount 
to torture as government officials inflict this physical pain on 
lawyers113 to intimidate them to behave in a certain way.114 This 
evidence shows a generalized tendency of China to violate 
prohibitions against torture.115 Therefore, because local Chinese 
officials caused Chen to physically suffer through beatings intended 
to punish Chen for his past actions and to intimidate him into ceasing 
his activism in the future,116 the Chinese government’s conduct 
toward Chen amounts to torture.117 Torture is a human rights 
violation118 and, consequently, a violation of international law. 
 
 110. See Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5 (failing to object to the 
claim that Chinese officials beat Chen while he was under house arrest). 
 111. E.g., Thomas Lum & Hannah Fischer, Human Rights in China: Trends and 
Policy Implications, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA 21 (Lee R. Massingdale ed., 
2009) (“Many human rights and defense lawyers have been harassed by officials or 
beaten by plain-clothes agents of local State agencies or economic interests.”). 
 112. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WALKING ON THIN ICE: CONTROL, INTIMIDATION 
AND HARASSMENT OF LAWYERS IN CHINA 41 (2008), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china0408_1.pdf. 
 113. See id. at 44 (detailing how court officials physically assaulted a lawyer 
who attempted to file a complaint with the court). 
 114. See Lum & Fischer, supra note 111, at 22 (“Lawyers who had publicly 
offered to defend Tibetan protesters in 2008 were warned not to get involved or 
they would face disciplinary action.”). 
 115. See id. at 20 (“The [S]tate [of China] still wields disproportionate power 
against citizens and legal activists and continues to interpret the law arbitrarily in 
many cases.”). 
 116. See MCCORQUODALE, supra note 109, at 371–72 (supporting that acts 
committed by local government officials are still attributable to the State in torture 
cases). 
 117. See Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (providing 
an analytical framework that demonstrates it is sufficient that there was 
acquiescence on the part of the Chinese government to the treatment of Chen to 
constitute torture). 
 118. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 80–81, 116 (Dec. 19) (ruling by a vote of sixteen to one 
that torture and other abuses conducted by the Republic of Uganda constituted a 
violation of “its obligation under international human rights law and international 
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Therefore, China’s torture of Chen is both a human rights violation 
and a violation of international law.  
B. THE UNITED STATES IS PROHIBITED FROM FORCIBLY 
RETURNING CHEN TO CHINA BECAUSE THERE IS SUFFICIENT 
REASON TO BELIEVE CHEN WILL BE SUBJECT TO TORTURE ON HIS 
RELEASE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIJING 
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture forbids the United 
States, under the doctrine of nonrefoulement, from returning Chen to 
China.119 Nonrefoulement prohibits a State from returning an 
individual to another State where that person is at risk to be 
tortured.120 To determine whether a person is at substantial risk of 
torture, the sending State must consider both specific and generalized 
tendencies of the receiving State to use torture.121 Chen’s case 
satisfies both of these conditions.  
China’s practices concerning prisoners and detainees demonstrate 
a significant risk of torture for legal activists like Chen in China. 
China has a lengthy record of torturing activists like Chen, showing a 
generalized tendency to engage in torture.122 According to the U.S. 
State Department, China often utilizes “extralegal measures” to 
intimidate and coerce public interest lawyers and political activists.123 
 
humanitarian law”). 
 119. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Bachan Singh Sogi v. Can., 
Communication No. 297/2006, U.N. Doc. A/63/44, at 224 (Nov. 16, 2007) (noting 
that, if a complainant establishes a substantial risk of torture in his country of 
origin, the complainant cannot be returned there); see also Bromfield, 543 F.3d at 
1079 (supporting that courts and tribunals often rely on country reports to establish 
evidence of an individual’s risk of torture or persecution in his or her home State). 
 120. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 3. 
 121. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil 
Agiza v. Swed., Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. A/60/44, at 227 (May 
20, 2005) (explaining both particularized and generalized tendencies are required 
because the existence of one does not necessitate the existence of the other). 
 122. See LI, supra note 30, at 120–22 (highlighting how, although physical 
abuse of prisoners and detainees is prohibited, torture regularly occurs in China). 
 123. See, e.g., STATE DEPARTMENT CHINA REPORT, supra note 30, at 4 
(documenting how Jiang Tianyoung, a lawyer in China, was beaten for two nights 
although he was ultimately never charged with anything); see also LI, supra note 
30, at 121–22 (detailing how security guards beat a recent college graduate for 
failing to carry the proper identification card). But see China Hits Back on U.S. 
Human Rights, CNN (May 25, 2012), articles.cnn.com/2012-05-25/asia_china-us-
human-rights_1_human-rights-china-hits-annual-report?_s=PM:ASIA (reporting 
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Additionally, the risk of torture in China of activists and dissidents is 
well-documented in asylum cases and claims for other relief brought 
in American courts under the Convention Against Torture.124 
Therefore, China’s generalized tendencies and practices show that 
Chen, as a lawyer and activist, faces a substantial risk that he will be 
tortured on his return.125  
Similarly, the particularized actions of local officials toward Chen 
establish that, once he was returned to China from the U.S. Embassy, 
he faced an exceptional risk of torture. Specifically, Chen and his 
family were subjected to torture through beatings and arbitrary house 
arrest.126 These instances occurred just days and weeks before he 
sought protection from the American Embassy.127 Furthermore, these 
actions of abuse against Chen were not part of his previous sentence, 
which was already completed when he was put under house arrest.128 
Thus, there is substantial risk that Chen’s torture will continue on his 
return to China as it occurred repeatedly until he sought refuge in the 
U.S. Embassy. 
Historically, nonrefoulement under the Convention Against 
Torture is applied in cases where the individual is within the territory 
 
Chinese criticism of the State Department’s report and claim that “[t]he United 
States’ tarnished human rights record has left it in no state to act as the world’s 
‘human rights justice’”). 
 124. See, e.g., Cao v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 407 F.3d 146, 156, 161 
(3d Cir. 2005) (finding a severe enough risk of torture to prevent repatriation). 
 125. See STATE DEPARTMENT CHINA REPORT, supra note 30, at 3–4 (noting that 
although rules of evidence ban the use of information gathered through torture, 
there are many reports of former prisoners and detainees, especially political and 
religious dissidents, being tortured). 
 126. Cf. Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Bachan Singh Sogi v. Can., 
Communication No. 297/2006, U.N. Doc. A/63/44, at 235 (Nov. 16, 2007) 
(finding removal of an Indian national from Canada violated the Convention 
Against Torture because there was sufficient specific evidence that the national 
would be tortured upon return to India for his alleged participation in a terrorist 
organization). 
 127. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, A.R. v. Neth., Communication No. 
203/2002, U.N. Doc. A/59/44, at 247–53 (Nov. 14, 2003) (articulating the 
requirement that acts showing specific tendencies must not have occurred too long 
before seeking refuge). 
 128. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 1 (establishing that the 
Convention does not apply to “pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions”). 
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of the State where they are seeking shelter.129 The fact that Chen was 
not actually within the borders of the United States, but in an 
American Embassy in his home State, does not undermine the United 
States’ duty to him because nonrefoulement has no geographic 
limitation.130 Although no cases have addressed nonrefoulement 
under the Convention Against Torture, its language is sufficiently 
similar to nonrefoulement under the Refugee Convention131 that the 
ruling in Haitian Interdiction is arguably applicable.132  
Under the Haitian Interdiction holding, nonrefoulement applies 
regardless of the protected individual’s geographic location. Indeed, 
Article 5 of the Convention Against Torture suggests that universal 
jurisdiction applies in torture cases, consistent with the holding in 
the Haitian Interdiction case.133 Additionally, given the intent of the 
Convention Against Torture is to prevent inhumane and degrading 
treatment,134 returning an individual to a risk of torture just because 
 
 129. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil 
Agiza v. Swed., Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. A/60/44, at 227 (May 
20, 2005) (regarding a complainant who was returned to Egypt by Sweden after 
seeking asylum in Stockholm). 
 130. See Haitian Interdiction v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶¶ 71, 157 (1997) 
(discussing the extension of the nonrefoulement duty under the Refugee 
Convention regardless of geographic location). 
 131. Compare Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 3(1) (stating 
that “[n]o State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be 
in danger of being subjected to torture”), with Refugee Convention, supra note 
53, art. 33 (declaring that “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion”). 
 132. See Haitian Interdiction, Case 10.675, ¶¶ 71, 88 (indicating that a State 
breaches its duty under customary international law and Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention when it returns a person to a place where he or she faces 
persecution). 
 133. Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 5(2) (“Each State party 
shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction 
over such offences [of torture] in cases where the alleged offender is present in any 
territory under its jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 134. See DANELIUS, supra note 41, at 1–2 (recounting that the “General 
Assembly specifically requested the Commission on Human Rights to draw up a 
draft convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, in the light of the principles embodied in the Torture 
Declaration”). 
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he or she was apprehended outside the territorial borders of a nation 
would defeat the purpose of the Convention.135 Thus, being under 
the authority of a State imposes obligations on the State not to 
frustrate the purpose of a treaty on a technicality.136 In addition, it 
does not matter that Chen did not seek asylum or refugee status 
when he reached the American embassy, because nonrefoulement, 
as imposed under the Convention Against Torture, does not require 
that the individual be a refugee or asylum-seeker.137  
Instead of forbidding the United States from taking action, 
international law actually imposes a duty on the United States to 
take measures to shelter Chen.138 The basic tenets of 
nonrefoulement prohibit the return of an individual to a State where 
he or she is at risk of torture, and because Chen is at substantial risk 
of torture in China, the United States cannot return him there. The 
Chinese government has shown both generalized and specific 
tendencies that make it likely that Chen will be tortured on his 
return to China.139 It does not matter that Chen entered American 
protection outside of U.S. territory because nonrefoulement has no 
territorial limitations.140 Since both Article 5 of the Convention 
 
 135. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 62, art. 18, 
(declaring that “[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty”); see also Brief of the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Haitian 
Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1, 11 (11th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-6060), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,UNHCR,AMICUS,HTI, 
4b03cd4c2,0.html1992) (arguing that denying individuals seized outside U.S. 
territory nonrefoulement protection defeats the purpose of the Refugee 
Convention). 
 136. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 62, art. 18 
(emphasizing that a State that has expressed its consent to be bound by a treaty is 
obligated to refrain from acts that would defeat the object of the treaty). 
 137. See Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding a 
claimant may obtain relief under the Convention Against Torture in American law 
even if the claimant cannot assert an asylum claim). 
 138. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 5 (extending universal 
jurisdiction to torture cases regardless of territory or nationality). 
 139. See, e.g., Cao v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 407 F.3d 146, 149–59 
(3d Cir. 2005) (finding that specific evidence of persecution of a doctor who 
spoke out about infanticide and evidence of general tendencies of the Chinese 
government merited protection under Article 3 of the Convention Against 
Torture). 
 140. See discussion supra Part II(C) (detailing the justifications for broadening 
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture beyond geographical limitations to 
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Against Torture and the Haitian Interdiction case impose 
nonrefoulement duties on State Parties, the United States is bound 
by these obligations.141  
If international law imposes an obligation on a State, that State 
cannot violate international law while simultaneously fulfilling that 
duty. Because the United States has a duty not to return Chen to 
China imposed by Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture,142 
the United States did not illegally infringe on China’s internal 
affairs by protecting Chen at the American Embassy.143  
By protecting Chen and refusing to return him to China, the 
United States has complied with its duties under international 
law.144 Furthermore, the United States did not interfere any more 
than was absolutely necessary to meet its obligations under the 
Convention Against Torture.145 This shows that the American 
Embassy intended to stay out of China’s internal affairs when 
possible.146 Indeed, the United States did not seek out Chen in 
China, but rather the United States simply protected Chen once he 
arrived at the American Embassy.147 Any alleged interference did 
not occur until after Chen arrived at the Embassy, meaning that the 
United States could not have meddled in China’s internal affairs 
before the obligation to protect Chen arose.  
 
apply universally). 
 141. See CASSESE, supra note 66, at 170 (mentioning that obligations are only 
imposed if a State has signed onto or agrees to be bound by a treaty). 
 142. See, e.g., Haitian Interdiction v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1997) 
(explaining that nonrefoulement protection was extended over Haitian refugees or 
boat people even though they were not physically on American soil). 
 143. See discussion infra Part III(C) (analyzing the dominance of jus cogens 
norms, particularly torture, over all other treaties). 
 144. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, arts. 1–5 (detailing the 
duty to define torture, to ensure it is criminalized, to assert jurisdiction over torture 
cases, and to not return a person to a country where they are in danger of being 
subjected to torture). 
 145. See Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6 (describing the manner in which Chen 
came under United States protection, with contact initiated by Chen’s supporters, 
not the United States). 
 146. See Ku, supra note 27 (describing that the United States bargained with 
Chinese officials for assurances of Chen’s safety). 
 147. See Chen, supra note 16 (recounting, in an article written by Chen himself, 
that he sought refuge in the American Embassy in Beijing after his escape from 
house arrest). 
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C. SOME HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, SUCH AS ENGAGING IN 
TORTURE, ARE ALSO VIOLATIONS OF JUS COGENS NORMS, 
JUSTIFYING INTERFERENCE BY THE UNITED STATES IN CHINA’S 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
When a conflict between jus cogens norms and treaty obligations 
exists, jus cogens norms supersede the treaty obligations.148 The 
prohibition of torture is a jus cogens norm from which China cannot 
derogate.149  
Even if China permits such treatment under its domestic laws, 
these national or local laws do not supersede duties imposed under 
international human rights law.150 However, Chinese domestic law 
actually prohibits torture of prisoners and detainees.151 This alone, 
however, does not inhibit China from violating international human 
rights law.152 Laws that make torture illegal are not enough to comply 
with jus cogens norms, especially when torture regularly occurs 
regardless of domestic law. The Chinese government was willfully 
blind to the torture perpetrated against Chen and his family by local 
officials, which is sufficient to constitute an act of torture.153 China’s 
acquiescence to the local officials’ torture amounts to a human rights 
violation.154 
By permitting torture against Chen, the Chinese government not 
 
 148. See CASSESE, supra note 66, at 177 (explaining that when a treaty conflicts 
with jus cogens norms, the treaty should be construed in a manner that is consistent 
with the jus cogens norm); see also ROTH, supra note 65, at 264 (noting that jus 
cogens restricts the substance of treaties by imposing duties that States must follow 
and must be incorporated in the treaties). 
 149. See discussion supra Part II(D) (establishing the obligations imposed by jus 
cogens norms on the international community). 
 150. See generally Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 62/02, OEA/Serv.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 ¶¶ 84–87 
(2002) (supporting, through precedent, the predominance of human rights law over 
domestic law). 
 151. STATE DEPARTMENT CHINA REPORT, supra note 30, at 3. 
 152. See Omelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that an inference of torture is sufficient to find government acquiescence). 
 153. See Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(endorsing the concept that willful blindness is sufficient to constitute an official 
act of torture). 
 154. See Omelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1060 (“It is enough that public officials 
could have inferred the alleged torture was taking place, remained willfully blind 
to it, or simply stood by because of their inability or unwillingness to oppose it.”). 
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only violated the Convention Against Torture, but also violated jus 
cogens norms, which prohibit a nation’s officials from engaging in or 
willfully permitting torture.155 The argument that China violated jus 
cogens is relatively simple: the prohibition of torture is a jus cogens 
norm,156 China tortured Chen,157 and therefore China violated jus 
cogens norm prohibiting torture. More complex is the question of 
what consequences will or should result from this violation.158  
The Chinese government argues that Article 41 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations supersedes the ability of the 
United States to respond to allegations of torture.159 However, when a 
treaty conflicts with a jus cogens norm, the inconsistent provision 
should be interpreted, if possible, to comply with the jus cogens 
norm.160 The conflict between Article 41 and the jus cogens 
prohibition of torture is that Article 41 seemingly prevents a State 
from abiding by its obligations in situations where an individual 
seeks shelter from another State’s jus cogens violations. Thus, China 
argues, Article 41 must be construed as inapplicable to situations 
where an embassy assists a foreign national suffering from severe 
human rights abuses under the host State.161  
Furthermore, because all States have a responsibility to prevent 
human rights abuses, the United States should take action to do so if 
possible.162 States are required to take every measure possible to 
prevent human rights abuses from occurring within their 
 
 155. See CASSESE, supra note 66, at 202–03 (declaring that the breach of 
protection of fundamental interests, which includes the prohibition of torture, is a 
violation of recognized jus cogens norms). 
 156. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 
64, § 102 cmt. k (arguing that the rule against torture is part of international law 
and that jus cogens permits no derogation of it). 
 157. See discussion supra Part III(B). 
 158. See CASSESE, supra note 66, at 206–08 (enumerating the legal effects of jus 
cogens norms on international law, including the following: invalidation of a treaty 
provision, interpretation of a treaty provision to conform with jus cogens norms, 
and granting universal criminal jurisdiction over the transgressors). 
 159. See Nong, supra note 25; Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5. 
 160. CASSESE, supra note 66, at 206. 
 161. See ROTH, supra note 65, at 264–65 (noting the importance of jus cogens in 
the normative hierarchy structure). 
 162. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, arts. 2, 5 (mandating that 
each State Party take action to prevent torture from occurring within its territory 
and to establish jurisdiction over cases of torture). 
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jurisdiction.163 Chen sought out American jurisdiction by fleeing to 
the American Embassy.164 Although an embassy is not the territory 
of the sending State, once a person is granted refuge in an embassy 
that person is under the sending State’s control even though the 
person is not within the State’s physical territory by virtue of the 
inviolability of the diplomatic mission.165 Once Chen sought 
protection from the American Embassy, the United States had an 
obligation to protect him from torture and human rights abuses.166  
Article 41 of the Vienna Convention prevents interference with the 
internal affairs of a State, whereas human rights principles are an 
area of international law; therefore, human rights issues cannot 
constitute internal affairs.167 As such, the responsibility to prevent 
human rights abuses, which runs to all States, cannot logically 
amount to an impermissible interference in a State’s internal 
affairs.168 Otherwise, violators could never be punished or held 
accountable for crimes that are committed within their own State, 
because those matters could simply be categorized as wholly 
internal.169  
 
 163. See Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 174 (July 29, 1988) (elucidating that protecting individuals 
from violations is the ultimate goal of human rights law). 
 164. See Perlez & Jacobs, supra note 6 (inferring that Chen, with the help of his 
supporters, subjected himself to American jurisdiction when he fled to the 
American Embassy and obtained temporary protection from the abuses of the 
Chinese government). 
 165. RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 64, § 466, 
cmt. b; see also Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 274–75 (Nov. 20, 
1950) (holding that a grant of asylum removes the individual from the host State’s 
jurisdiction even though the individual may still be within the host State’s 
territory). 
 166. See RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 64, § 
466, cmt. b (Reporter’s note 3) (adding that the United States typically only grants 
such protection in exceptional cases to political refugees who are in immediate 
danger). 
 167. See Vienna Convention, supra note 27, art. 41 (preventing interference 
with internal affairs (emphasis added)). 
 168. CASSESE, supra note 66, at 394; see also Dominquez v. United States, Case 
12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 62/02, OEA/Serv.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 
rev. 1 (2002) (declaring that human rights law supersedes domestic law). 
 169. See CASSESE, supra note 66, at 398 (remarking that institutional 
enforcement mechanisms such as the United Nations “have not yielded 
conspicuous results”). 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Chen’s case presents an opportunity for the international 
community to enhance protection for victims of torture and human 
rights abuses. To avoid future diplomatic conflicts in cases where a 
national of a host State seeks protection from a foreign State’s 
embassy170 it is necessary to clarify the law regarding the obligations 
of States in such circumstances.171  
A. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CLARIFY ITS POLICY REGARDING 
ARTICLE 41 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RIGHTS 
WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL SEEKS PROTECTION WITHIN AN EMBASSY 
Article 41’s language concerning what actions amount to 
interference in internal affairs is ambiguous, prompting 
disagreements over its interpretation. One pivotal issue in Chen’s 
case revolves around what actions constitute interference in the 
internal affairs of a State.172 The problem is that international law 
does not define or even provide guidance on what actions constitute 
interference in internal affairs of a host State.173 If this ambiguity 
were explicitly clarified, then all States would have a consistent 
understanding of their duties.174 
 
 170. E.g., Flintoff, supra note 3 (referring to Fang Lizhi who experienced abuse 
similar to that inflicted on Chen). 
 171. See DENZA, supra note 1, at 465 (“Most conduct which on the part of a 
diplomatic agent lays him open to the charge of interference in the internal affairs 
of the receiving State will at least in democratic societies be permissible under 
local law and quite proper in the case of a citizen of the receiving State.”). 
 172. See Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5 (“China demands the  
US to apologize for that, carry out a thorough investigation into the incident, deal 
with those responsible, and promise not to let similar incidents happen again.”). 
See also Nong, supra note 25 (denouncing the United State’s actions as 
interference in internal affairs by hindering the economic development of China); 
US Must Insist on Chen Guangcheng’s Safety, AMNESTY INT’L (May 2,  
2012), www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/us-must-insist-on-chen-guangcheng-
s-safety (arguing the United States, and other governments, have an obligation to 
protect Chen and other Chinese citizens from human rights abuses). 
 173. See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 2, at 76 (citing Memorandum of Reply 
Concerning the Bill for the Approval of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, 1984 NYIL 308) (stating there are no international guidelines regarding 
Article 41 and “it should be pointed out that there are any number of ways in 
which a person could set about interfering in internal affairs”). 
 174. See Milhaupt, supra note 39, at 847 (asserting that under some 
interpretations anything negatively affecting or even implicating the host State 
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The most comprehensive way to clarify Article 41 would be to 
amend the convention directly. Although it would be impracticable 
to designate every possible action as either interference or 
noninterference, it would be possible to prevent interference in 
internal affairs by providing guidance on what exactly this means.175 
For example, an amendment could specify that interference in 
internal affairs would not be found where the alleged interfering 
State is acting under a jus cogens or treaty obligation. This would 
have the added benefit of designating levels of authority, indicating 
to States which sources of international law supersede others. Thus, 
in future similar incidents, there would be some kind of precedent 
revealing what authority binds a State.  
Alternatively, it would be helpful to change Article 41(1) to read 
that there is a “duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State 
through personal activities or comments.” This new construction of 
Article 41 would make it clear that the rule does not apply to 
measures taken by an embassy pursuant to its duties under 
international law simply because they incidentally touch on domestic 
issues.176 Amending Article 41 in this way would clarify its 
ambiguous language, leading to a more consistent understanding of 
this section. 
B. THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE SHOULD INCLUDE A 
PROVISION CLEARLY STATING THAT ARTICLE 3 APPLIES 
REGARDLESS OF GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION  
Another way to clarify States’ responsibilities is to unquestionably 
extend universal jurisdiction to the doctrine of nonrefoulement. 
Nonrefoulement provides strong protections to individuals who face 
persecution in their home countries.177 Although Article 5 imposes 
 
could be considered interference in internal affairs). 
 175. See DENZA, supra note 1, at 464 (explaining that the rule in Article 41(1) 
was intended to concern the personal comments or activities conducted by a 
diplomat in a host State and not to acts carried out on directive from the sending 
State). 
 176. See Milhaupt, supra note 39, at 847 (examining several alternatives, 
including, but not limited to, expanding the list of consular functions specified 
within the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). 
 177. See generally Shafer, supra note 50, § 2 (exploring the enactment of 
Convention Against Torture provisions within the United States and American 
courts’ interpretation of the Convention). 
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universal jurisdiction regarding instances of torture, the Convention 
Against Torture does not explicitly state that nonrefoulement applies 
regardless of geographic limitations.178  
Case law under the Convention Against Torture does not impose 
geographical limitations on the application of Article 3.179 However, 
nonrefoulement as defined in the Refugee Convention has been held 
to apply without any geographical constraints.180 The Convention 
Against Torture should therefore incorporate a provision that 
encompasses the holding of the Haitian Interdiction case. 
Specifically, to clarify state obligations, such a provision should state 
that the principle of nonrefoulement applies no matter where an 
individual comes under the receiving State’s protection.181 This 
clarification would create a uniform nonrefoulement policy.  
Modifying the Convention Against Torture, however, is not the 
only way to ensure the Convention applies regardless of geographic 
limitations. Instead of an addition to Article 3 of the Convention 
Against Torture, the United States could also amend the enabling 
statute that codifies the Convention Against Torture.182 The United 
 
 178. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 5(2) (stating that 
“[e]ach State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is 
present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant 
to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article”). 
 179. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Bachan Singh Sogi v. Can., 
Communication No. 297/2006, U.N. Doc. A/63/44, at 224–35 (Nov. 16, 2007) 
(focusing mostly on the different factors that the court considered when 
determining whether a man faced a risk of torture if returned to India); Rep. of the 
Comm. Against Torture, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Swed., 
Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. A/60/44, at 197 (May 20, 2005) (failing 
to mention the applicability of nonrefoulement when an individual is brought 
under protection outside of a State’s physical territory); Rep. of the Comm. 
Against Torture, A.R. v. Neth., Communication No. 203/2002, U.N. Doc. A/59/44, 
at 247, 252 (Nov. 14, 2003) (recording only factors relevant to determining 
whether there is a risk of torture). 
 180. Haitian Interdiction v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 171 (1997) (finding that 
nonrefoulement applies to Haitian refugees intercepted on the high seas by the U.S. 
Coast Guard despite not being on American soil). 
 181. See Political Prisoners in China, supra note 108 (describing the glacial 
pace of discussions between the United States and China on human rights issues 
and encouraging increased dialogue between the two nations). 
 182. See 60 Fed. Reg. 8478 (Feb. 19, 1999) (referring only to the removal of 
individuals from the United States and not to any geographic element necessary for 
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States often clarifies treaty obligations through domestic law.183  
Although domestic laws do not necessarily create international 
legal obligations, in this case it could help demonstrate a state 
practice of applying nonrefoulement regardless of geographic 
location. In accordance with Congress’ own commitment to Article 
3,184 it should apply Article 3 privileges regardless of where an alien 
enters American protection. This would strengthen the enforceability 
of the Convention Against Torture in the United States in accordance 
with international law. Whether it is appended to the Convention 
Against Torture or to the United States’ enabling statute, the new 
language should state that Article 3 of the Convention Against 
Torture applies without any geographical limitations.185 
V. CONCLUSION 
By protecting Chen at the American Embassy in Beijing, the 
United States did not violate international law, contrary to the 
Chinese government’s claims.186 The United States cannot legally 
return Chen to China because there is sufficient reason to believe that 
he will be tortured on his return.187 Because Article 3 of the 
Convention Against torture imposes a duty on the United States not 
to return Chen,188 the American Embassy did not illegally infringe on 
 
protection). 
 183. Id.; see also Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(maintaining that an individual may seek relief under the Convention regardless of 
an asylum claim). 
 184. See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 
8478 (Feb. 19, 1999) (confirming that Congress intended to uphold Article 3 and 
that future obligations must be consistent with treaty obligations). 
 185. See Haitian Interdiction v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 157 (1997) (“The 
Commission shares the view advanced by the United Nations Commissioner for 
Refugees in its Amicus Curiae brief in its arguments before the Supreme Court, 
that Article 33 [establishing nonrefoulement in the Refugee Convention] had no 
geographical limitations.”). 
 186. See Remarks on Entering Embassy, supra note 5 (describing the Chinese 
government’s dissatisfaction with the U.S. Embassy’s actions); Nong, supra note 
25 (same). 
 187. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 42, art. 3 (stating that the 
doctrine of nonrefoulement applies when there are substantial grounds to believe 
that he or she would be subject to torture in his or her home country). 
 188. See Haitian Interdiction v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1997) (applying this 
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China’s internal affairs by protecting Chen. Furthermore, China’s 
treatment of Chen amounts to torture,189 which is a violation of the 
jus cogens norm prohibiting torture.190 Because no derogation from 
jus cogens norms is permitted, China’s violations justify limited 
encroachment by the United States.191  
 
 
obligation even to individuals brought under protection outside the territory of the 
United States). 
 189. C.f. Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(evaluating the case of a gay man who faced torture in Jamaica). 
 190. See Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 62/02, OEA/Serv.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 ¶¶ 84–87 (2002) (indicating 
that practices that the global community considers to be inconsistent with 
prevailing standards of decency violate jus cogens norms). 
 191. See RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 64, § 703 
(declaring that a State “may pursue international remedies against any other state 
for a violation of the customary international law of human rights”). 
